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Protecting Privacy with the MPEG-21 IPMP
Framework
Nicholas Paul Sheppard Reihaneh Safavi-Naini
Abstract
A number of authors have observed a duality between privacy pro-
tection and copyright protection, and, in particular, observed how digital
rights management technology may be used as the basis of a privacy pro-
tection system. In this paper, we describe our experiences in implementing
a privacy protection system based on the Intellectual Property Manage-
ment and Protection (“IPMP”) components of the MPEG-21 Multimedia
Framework. Our approach allows individuals to express their privacy
preferences in a way enabling automatic enforcement by data users’ com-
puters. This required the design of an extension to the MPEG Rights Ex-
pression Language to cater for privacy applications, and the development
of software that allowed individuals’ information and privacy preferences
to be securely collected, stored and interpreted.
1 Introduction
The increasing use of electronic records in commerce, government, health and
other fields has led to public fears about the potential mis-uses of private data.
Once personal information has been submitted to an organisation, the subject
of that information no longer controls what becomes of it, and organisations or
rogue parties within organisations have the potential to mis-use the information
through negligence or dishonesty.
While some organisations publish privacy protection policies, there is no
technological guarantee that the policy espoused by the organisation will actu-
ally be followed by the people who have access to personal information. Fur-
thermore, the privacy policies offered by organisations may not always meet
the requirements or desires of the individuals who are the subjects of personal
information held by those organisations.
Digital rights management (“DRM”) provides protection for information by
making access to information depend on satisfying the conditions imposed by
a licence written in a machine-enforceable rights expression language. DRM
technology is widely used in copyright protection applications, but can also be
applied to privacy protection [14] by developing licences that represent indi-
viduals’ preferences for use of their personal information. The digital rights
management approach to privacy is detailed in Section 2.
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The MPEG-21 Multimedia Framework [9] is a framework for creating, dis-
tributing, navigating, using and controlling multimedia content, currently under
development by the Motion Picture Experts Group (“MPEG”). Of particular
interest to this paper, MPEG-21 proposes to incorporate an Intellectual Prop-
erty Management and Protection framework within which content providers can
control the use and distribution of multimedia content. In this paper, we con-
sider that “multimedia content” might include personal information such as
contact details and financial records. We will give an outline of the relevent
components of the MPEG-21 Framework in Section 3.
The MPEG Rights Expression Language supplies a vocabulary of elements
useful in copyright protection applications, but lacks elements that are useful
in privacy protection applications. In Section 4, we outline how we developed
a “privacy extension schema” (in the sense of XML Schema) for MPEG REL,
based on a study of vocabularies developed for the Platform for Privacy Prefer-
ences [22] and Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language [19]. Our extension
allows individuals to express how they allow their data to be used in terms
of actions and conditions that can be interpreted by an automated computer
terminal.
In Section 5, we describe the extension of an existing MPEG-21-based digital
rights management system to a privacy protection scenario. Our implementa-
tion allows a service provider to collect individuals’ data in the form of XML
documents, while the use and distribution of these documents is restricted ac-
cording to conditions supplied by the data’s owner.
Our system demonstrates the fundamentals of the DRM approach to pri-
vacy, but leaves substantial opportunity for further work in a number of areas
including the composition of licences, management of protected information
and provision for exceptional circumstances. We will conclude the paper with a
discussion of outstanding issues in Section 6.
2 Digital Rights Management and Privacy Pro-
tection
Zittrain [24] observed a duality between protection of private data, and protec-
tion of copyrighted material: in both cases, we have a provider who wishes to
make some information available to a third party in return for some financial
reward or service, but does not wish to make the information publicly available.
Technical approaches to protecting copyright, therefore, might be expected to
yield insights into technical approaches to protecting privacy.
Kenny and Korba [14] later examined applying digital rights management
technology in the context of the European Union’s Data Protection Directive.
Unlike models of privacy protection in which the privacy policy is developed by
the database operator, the digital rights management model permits the data
subject to choose the policy to be applied to his or her data.
Figure 1 shows the architecture of a typical digital rights management sys-
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Figure 1: A typical digital rights management system
tem. Data is created by a provider, and transmitted in a protected (for example,
encrypted) form to a user via some distribution channel. In order to access the
protected data, the user must obtain a licence from the licence issuer. A licence
is a document containing the terms of use of the data and the cryptographic
information required to access the protected content.
Protected data may only be accessed using special terminals certified to
behave in accordance with the terms specified in the licence, and not to reveal
the unprotected content or decryption keys to the human user of the terminal.
By controlling the licences that are made available to users via the licence issuer,
the provider can control whether or not content is copied between users, how
many times content is used, and so on.
In a privacy protection context, the provider is a data subject whose privacy
is at stake should an item of data be mis-used in some way. A data user may
require access to the data for some purpose, such as completing a transaction
requested by the data subject. In order to gain access to the data, the data
user must obtain a licence from the licence issuer. Licences issued by the licence
issuer are controlled in some way by the data subject, either directly or by
having the issuer act according a policy supplied by the data subject. The data
user can then access the data according to the terms of the licence.
Several DRM-like approaches to privacy protection have been reported in
the literature, often for specific applications such as location privacy. We are
not aware of any attempt, however, to develop a privacy protection system in
the digital rights management model as complete as those currently available
for copyright protection.
Cha and Joung’s On-Line Personal Data Licensing (“OPDL”) system [3]
allows data subjects to issue licences using a personal data licensor. The per-
sonal data licensor is much like the licence issuer in a digital rights management
system. OPDL licences are based on the policy language defined by the Plat-
form for Privacy Preferences (“P3P”) [22]. P3P, however, was not designed for
this purpose and does not provide for automated enforcement of the policies
expressed in its policy language. In OPDL, licences are simply stored and made
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available to any audit of the privacy practices of the data collector.
Hong and Landay’s Confab architecture [8] for ubiquitous computing allows
items of data to be associated with a “privacy tag” (licence). The privacy tag
specifies the conditions under which the data may be retained, and provides an
e-mail address to which notifications of disclosure can be sent. The tag does
not specify how the data may be used or shared, however.
The most similar system to the one described in this paper is the Personal
DRM (“PDRM”) system of Gunter, et al. [7]. PDRM is a location privacy
system in which individuals may make their current location available in order
to receive some service, such as alerting them to the proximity of their friends.
Individuals’ privacy is protected by associating their location data with a licence
written in the Extensible Rights Markup Language (“XrML”) [4], which is the
predecessor of the language used by MPEG-21 and in this paper.
PDRM’s XrML, however, makes extensive use of P3P policy files to describe
users’ privacy preferences and Gunter, et al. do not describe any method by
which these preferences can be enforced. For the system described in the present
paper, we developed a rights expression language within the model used by both
XrML and MPEG-21 that can be enforced using the standard algorithm for
interpreting these languages.
3 MPEG-21
Unlike the well-known MPEG-1, -2 and -4 standards, MPEG-21 does not define
the way in which individual multimedia presentations are encoded, but defines
ways in which atomic multimedia objects can be used, combined, navigated
and referenced. It consists of numerous parts, some of which have been ratified
by the International Standards Organisation as the ISO/IEC 21000 series of
standards, while others remain under development. In this section, we will give
an overview of the components of MPEG-21 required to understand this paper.
3.1 Digital Items
The core notion in MPEG-21 is the notion of a digital item [10], which represents
a collection of multimedia objects related in some way. Digital items are de-
scribed using the XML-based digital item declaration language (“DIDL”), which
organises content and meta-data into a hierarchical structure. For the purposes
of this paper, the most important elements are:
Resources. Atomic multimedia objects such as images, sounds and videos.
Components. Resources together with their descriptors.
Descriptors. Meta-data, such as identifiers, MPEG-7 descriptors, etc.
Figure 2 shows a simple digital item declaration, similar to the digital items
used in our system. It consists of a single item containing a single component.
The resource is an XML document contained by the MyXML tags (the body
4
<didl:DIDL>
<didl:Item>
<didl:Component>
<didl:Descriptor>
<didl:Statement>
<dii:Identifier>urn:smartinternet:doc:1</dii:Identifier>
</didl:Statement>
</didl:Descriptor>
<didl:Resource>
<myxml:MyXML>...</myxml:MyXML>
</didl:Resource>
</didl:Component>
</didl:Item>
</didl:DIDL>
Figure 2: A simple digital item declaration.
of the document has been omitted for brevity), and is identified by the URN
urn:smartinternet:doc1.
3.2 Intellectual Property Management and Protection
Intellectual property management and protection (“IPMP”) is MPEG’s term
for digital rights management [11]. MPEG-21 does not fix a particular digital
rights management system, but assumes that IPMP functionality is provided
by vendor-specific IPMP tools that can be downloaded and made accessible to
the terminal as necessary. IPMP tools may implement basic functions such as
decryption and watermarking, or may implement complete digital rights man-
agement systems in their own right.
We say a resource is governed if it is protected by one or more IPMP tools.
Each governed resource is associated with a plaintext identifier and an IPMP
information descriptor that associates the resource with a licence and describes
the IPMP tools required to access the resource. If the conditions of the licence
are satisfied, the terminal must obtain and instantiate the IPMP tools in order
to access the resource.
A large part of the work done on our original digital rights management
system involved the design and implementation of IPMP tools. The security
architecture used by our tools is described in Appendix B, but the technical
detail of their implementation is beyond the scope of the present paper.
3.3 Rights Expression Language
Though MPEG-21 does not define a full digital rights management system, it
does define a rights expression language known as “MPEG REL” [12]. MPEG
REL is closely based on the Extensible Rights Markup Language (“XrML”) [4].
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An MPEG REL licence is structured as a collection of grants issued by some
licence issuer. Each grant awards some right over some specified resource to a
specified principal, that is, user of a resource. Each grant may be subject to a
condition, such that the right contained in the grant cannot be exercised unless
the condition is satisfied.
In order to perform some action on a resource, a user (principal) must possess
a licence containing a grant that awards the right to perform that action on
that resource, and satisfy the associated condition. This must be checked by
the terminal prior to exercising the right.
MPEG REL is defined as a collection of three XML schemata, called the
core schema (denoted by the XML namespace prefix r in this paper), the stan-
dard extension schema (prefix sx) and the multimedia extension schema (prefix
mx). These schemata define the fundamental elements of the language, some
widely-useful conditions, and elements useful in copyright protection applica-
tions, respectively. We will later discuss the development of a privacy extension
schema for use in privacy protection applications. We will denote elements of
the privacy extension schema by the namespace prefix px.
Figure 3 shows an example of an MPEG REL grant allowing a principal
(r:keyHolder) identified by his or her public key to print a resource (mx:diRef-
erence) identified by a digital item identifier urn:smartinternet:doc1. The
principal is only permitted to print the resource once (sx:ExerciseLimit).
<r:grant>
<r:keyHolder>
<r:info>
<dsig:KeyValue>
<dsig:RSAKeyValue>...</dsig:RSAKeyValue>
</dsig:KeyValue>
</r:keyHolder>
<mx:print/>
<mx:diReference>
<mx:identifier>urn:smartinternet:doc1</mx:identifier>
</mx:diReference>
<sx:ExerciseLimit>
<sx:count>1</sx:count>
</sx:ExerciseLimit>
<r:grant>
Figure 3: An MPEG REL grant.
XrML and MPEG REL are provided with a vocabulary useful in copy-
right protection applications. In the following section, we will discuss extending
MPEG REL with a vocabulary suitable for privacy protection applications.
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4 Expressing Privacy Preferences in MPEG REL
As described in Section 2, previous authors have attempted to enlist the P3P
policy language for expressing the privacy preferences of data subjects. The
intention of P3P, however, is to inform data subjects of the global privacy prac-
tices of Internet service providers. Here, we require data subjects to specify
their preferences regarding the handling of a particular item of data. P3P
seems poorly suited to the latter task since it provides no way of identifying a
specific item of data or a specific data user. Furthermore, P3P does not provide
for automated enforcement of privacy policies and we are not aware of any al-
gorithms for determining whether or not a given action is permissible, given a
P3P policy.
Recognising the shortcomings of P3P as an enforcement tool, researchers at
IBM proposed the Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (“EPAL”) [19].
EPAL is intended to express an organisation’s privacy policy in such a way as to
make it enforceable by an access control system. EPAL’s structure is very similar
to that of MPEG REL and other access control languages such as the Extensible
Access Control Markup Language (“XACML”) [17]: policies in all of these
languages consist of a series of rules expressing the right of some actor to perform
some action on some object, subject to certain conditions and obligations. EPAL
has an additional element called purpose that makes permission conditional on
the action being performed for some particular purpose.
EPAL and XACML, however, require each organisation to define its own
vocabulary of actors, actions, etc. for use in their access control policies. In
our application, it seems highly impractical to require data subjects to use a
different vocabulary for every service provider with which he or she interacts.
MPEG REL is specifically designed for the digital rights management model,
provides a vocabulary that is constant across all service providers, and speci-
fies an algorithm for determining whether or not a given action is permissible.
However, the existing MPEG REL vocabulary was designed with only copyright
protection applications in mind and it lacks elements to describe principals,
rights and conditions that may be useful in privacy protection applications. For
example, privacy protection systems often restrict the use of data to a particular
transaction, but MPEG REL does not define any conditions that support this.
For the purposes of the prototype system described in Section 5, we designed
a preliminary privacy extension schema by examining existing vocabularies for
P3P (including drafts of P3P Version 1.1) and EPAL [18]. The detailed syntax
of the extension was worked out by attempting to write licences for a variety
of simple scenarios, and making corrections as necessary until the licences we
wanted could be written reasonably conveniently. The resulting schema was
applied to the customer service application considered in this paper.
The detailed development of a comprehensive privacy extension schema is
left as the topic for another paper. In this section, we will simply summarise
the major observations we made while developing our schema. A summary of
the schema we derived is given in Appendix A.
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Purposes. Perhaps the most conspicuous difference between MPEG REL and
languages developed in privacy protection is the latter’s use of “purposes”. Dif-
ferent languages make somewhat different uses of the term – P3P Version 1.1
even goes so far as to use the term twice: once as “purpose” then again as
“primary purpose”. Purposes are widely used in human-readable privacy poli-
cies, but to be enforceable by machine they need to be interpreted as some
combination of a particular principal exercising a particular right under certain
conditions.
P3P’s notion of a “purpose” generally corresponds to a combination of a
right and one or more conditions in MPEG REL. For example, P3P’s con-
tact and telemarketing purposes can be interpreted as the right to contact
someone, under the condition that it not be by telephone or be by telephone,
respectively.
The use of “purpose” in EPAL at first recalls a condition in MPEG REL, and
of course it would be possible to simply create an MPEG REL condition called
Purpose that made a grant available only if the right was exercised for some
specified purpose. This is, in fact, how purposes are treated in the Privacy Policy
Profile of XACML Version 2.0. In our schema, we chose to create a different
condition for every purpose that we interpreted in this way – this makes the
vocabulary of purposes shared by all uses of the language.
However, a number of the purposes identified in [18] may be better imple-
mented as roles in the sense of a role-based access control system. For example,
it is much more straightforward to check that a principal is acting in the role
of a police officer than it is to check directly that he or she is carrying out law
enforcement. MPEG REL supports role-based principals using the Property-
Possessor principal (e.g. a principal who possesses the property of being a
police officer). We will give more detail about how these elements are used in
Section 5.
Obligations. EPAL and XACML distinguish “conditions” and “obligations”
that represent conditions that must be true before access is permitted, and
actions that must be carried out after access is permitted. MPEG REL con-
flates obligations with conditions – we can think of obligations as being post-
conditions and EPAL/XACML-style conditions as being pre-conditions. It is
straightforward to express widely-used obligations involving notification and
data retention, for example, using TrackReport and ValidityInterval condi-
tions in MPEG REL.
Recipients. P3P and [18] consider “recipients” who have data disclosed to
them by someone with direct access to the database, but who do not have
direct access to the database themselves. In the model used by P3P and EPAL,
it makes sense to make the discloser to be the principal of an access control
rule and make the identity of the recipient a condition. In the digital rights
management model, however, it makes more sense to identify the recipient as
the principal of a grant that is given directly to that recipient. The “discloser”
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Figure 4: SITDRM Enterprise Architecture
can give the data to the recipient in its protected form without needing to access
the data him- or herself.
5 Enforcing Privacy Preferences with SITDRM
In order to explore the digital rights management approach to privacy protec-
tion, we applied our existing implementation of MPEG-21’s IPMP Components
– known as “SITDRM” – to a privacy protection scenario.
SITDRM was designed to allow businesses to license multimedia works from
their web site, using the MPEG-21 IPMP framework to ensure that buyers
complied with the terms of the licence they had purchased. In the project
described by this paper, we took the IPMP technology that underpins SITDRM
and applied it to the protection of customer records submitted via a company’s
web site. We call the new system “SITDRM Enterprise”.
Figure 4 shows an overview of the SITDRM Enterprise system. We assume
that some service provider (the data controller) requires information to be col-
lected from its customers (data subjects), and that all of this information is
stored in some central database. The service provider’s employees (data users)
then require access to the information in order to carry out their jobs and pro-
vide service to the customers.
Customers submit their information via a form on the service provider’s web
site. In our example, the document contained the customer’s postal address,
e-mail address and telephone number formatted as an XML document using
the Extensible Customer Information Language (“xCIL”) [16]. In principle, the
service provider can set up the web site to collect any information formatted as
an XML document. At the same time, customers may design an MPEG REL
licence that describes how this information may be used.
Upon submitting the form, the customer’s web browser converts the resulting
XML document into the governed resource of an MPEG-21 digital item, and
issues the licence designed by the customer. The governed item and issued
licence are then transmitted to the data controller for storage.
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Employees who require access to a customer’s data may download the gov-
erned item from the data controller. Upon attempting to perform some action
on the item, the employee’s terminal asks the data controller for a licence that
authorises this action. If an appropriate licence is found, the action is permitted
to continue. Otherwise, the action is rejected.
In general, governed items and licences can also be passed on to third parties
(such as related companies) via e-mail or the like. If the customer has granted
a licence that permits the third party to access his or her data, the third party
can access this data as for employees of the original service provider. Our initial
scenario considers data distributed within one company only, however.
5.1 Security Architecture
SITDRM Enterprise uses the same techniques used to preserve the integrity of
the digital rights management as were used in the original copyright protection
application. Our fundamental requirement is that every terminal be tamper-
resistant and be supplied with a public/private key pair of which the private
key is known only to the terminal – in particular, it is not known to the human
user of the terminal. We further assume that a public key infrastructure exists
that allows all public keys to be verified.
Every governed resource is encrypted using a unique resource key. Any
licence that grants permission to use this resource must contain the resource
key encrypted either by the public key of the terminal on which the resource
is to be used, or by a key that can be obtained from a second licence without
which the first licence would be invalid. In this way, a resource can only be
decrypted by a tamper-resistant terminal in possession of a valid set of licences.
The integrity of licences is ensured by having them signed by their issuer.
For clarity of the main body of this paper, we have omitted the details of
cryptographic operations in the remainder of this section. A complete descrip-
tion of SITDRM’s security architecture is given in Appendix B.
5.2 Licences
Two kinds of licences are used in SITDRM Enterprise: membership certificates
permit individual data users to act as members of roles using the PossessProp-
erty right, while resource licences permit members of roles to perform actions
using the PropertyPossessor principal.
In order for a particular data user to carry out an action on a document,
he or she must obtain both a resource licence that permits some role to carry
out that action, and a membership certificate that makes him or her a member
of that role. Examples of a membership certificate and a resource licence are
given in Figures 5 and 6, respectively.
Membership certificates can be obtained from a role issuer operated by the
service provider. The role issuer is simply a licence issuer in the sense described
in Section 2. We assume that the role issuer is operated by some reputable
administrator who is trusted to issue membership certificates only to individuals
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<r:grant>
<r:keyHolder>
<r:info>
<dsig:KeyValue>
<dsig:RSAKeyValue>...</dsig:RSAKeyValue>
</dsig:KeyValue>
</r:keyHolder>
<sx:possessProperty/>
<sx:propertyUri definition="urn:smartinternet:customer-service"/>
</r:grant>
Figure 5: A membership certificate for the
urn:smartinternet:customer-service role.
<r:grant>
<r:propertyPossessor>
<sx:propertyUri definition="urn:smartinternet:customer-service"/>
</r:propertyPossessor>
<mx:play/>
<mx:diReference>
<mx:identifier>urn:smartinternet:customers:123</mx:identifier>
</mx:diReference>
</r:grant>
Figure 6: A licence that allows members of the
urn:smartinternet:customer-service role to view the document
urn:smartinternet:customers:123.
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who have reason to act in those roles. In a real company, we might expect the
role issuer to be under the control of human resources staff who assign roles to
employees according to the terms of their employment.
Resource licences are issued by data subjects. The details of generating and
issuing appropriate licences will be discussed in Section 5.3.
5.3 Submitting Governed Documents
A service provider who wishes to collect information from his or her customers
may design a form for doing so using XForms [23]. XForms’ ability to manipulate
arbitrary XML documents without programming makes it very appealing to web
designers who need to present documents written in machine-oriented languages
such as xCIL and MPEG REL in way that is accessible to human users.
Every XForms form is associated with an XML document called the instance
document. Every control on the form is identified with a node of the instance
document using an XPath expression [21], and the user’s input to a control
determines the content of the associated XML node. Initial values for controls
can be supplied by the data controller by supplying an initial instance document
containing those values. When the user chooses to submit the form, the instance
document is uploaded to the server.
The present application uses two kinds of instance documents: data and
licences. We require that the former kind be encrypted before it is uploaded
to the server, and that the latter kind be signed before it is uploaded. For
this purpose, we added a new attribute to the submission element of XForms –
called transform – that indicates what kind of post-processing should be applied
to the instance document prior to uploading it. We use transformations called
govern and issue that cause the instance document to be converted into an
MPEG-21 governed digital item and issued as licence, respectively.
A simple form for editing a document and a licence is shown in Figure 7.
Each model element in the head of the HTML page describes one instance
document, and every control on the form is associated with a model using the
model attribute. In the example, model d represents the document and model l
represents the licence. The submit button and other details have been omitted
or abbreviated for brevity.
The form in Figure 7 initialises the instance documents from templates on
the server called document.xml and licence.xml. In our example application,
the document template is a skeleton xCIL document whose fields will be filled
in by the form controls.
The licence template, however, is a near-complete licence similar to the one
shown in Figure 8. This template supplies technical information such as the
identifier for the role that will be using the information, while allowing the data
subject to change the permissible contact method using the form. Data subjects
may view the complete technical details of the licence using a toolbar option.
In principle it is possible to design a form that allows the data subject to
make any change to the licence he or she wishes. Such a form, however, would
likely be very intimidating to users and we expect that most users would only be
12
<h:head>
<f:model id="d">
<f:instance src="/templates/document.xml"/>
<f:submission action="/submission/document" transform="govern"/>
</f:model>
<f:model id="l">
<f:instance src="/templates/licence.xml"/>
<f:submission action="/submission/licence" transform="issue"/>
</f:model>
</h:head>
<h:body>
<f:input model="d" ref="/ci:xCIL/.../ci:ContactNumber">
<f:label>Phone Number</f:label>
</f:input>
<f:input model="l"
ref="/r:license/.../px:ContactMethodUri/@definition">
<f:label>Voice or SMS</f:label>
</f:input>
</h:body>
Figure 7: A form for editing a document and a licence.
<r:grant>
<r:propertyPossessor>
<sx:propertyUri definition="urn:smartinternet:customer-service"/>
</r:propertyPossessor>
<px:contact/>
<px:contactMethods>
<px:contactMethodUri definition="changeme"/>
</px:contactMethods>
</r:grant>
Figure 8: A licence template for Figure 7.
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(a) (b)
Figure 9: IPDoc: (a) the main window and log-in dialogue and (b) a document
window.
interested in modifying a few simple conditions like the one shown in Figure 8.
We will discuss this issue further in Section 6.
5.4 Accessing Governed Documents
Anyone with access to the data controller is permitted to download any of the
documents and licences stored there. Documents and licences so obtained may
be further distributed using other channels, for example, by e-mailing them
to other companies or saving them to physical media. However, a governed
document can only be accessed on a DRM-compliant terminal and only if that
terminal is provided with licences that permit access to that document.
In our implementation, a DRM-compliant terminal is represented by an ap-
plication called “IPDoc” that allows users to download governed documents
from the server and perform actions on them if there are licences permitting
them to do so. Some screenshots from IPDoc are shown in Figure 9.
IPDoc’s main window lists the identifiers of all of the documents in the
database. Before any documents can be used, the user must log-in with a name
and password, and specify the task that he or she intends to perform – in this
case, either “renewals” or “marketing”. Of course the latter selection is open to
abuse since the computer cannot check what the user actually intends, but it
serves to at least prevent honest users from using or disclosing data by mistake.
When the user selects a document from the main window, IPDoc downloads
the document from the database and opens a new window with menu options
for performing various actions on the document. If the user chooses to perform
an action on a document, IPDoc first searches for any licence that permits that
action. If it finds one, and that licence requires the user to be a member of a
particular role in order to be used, it then searches for a membership certificate
that permits the current user to act in that role. If it finds one, the action is
permitted. Otherwise the action is rejected and an error message is displayed.
6 Lessons Learnt and Future Work
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Composing Licences. To be enforceable, licences must be expressed in terms
of the internal structure and procedures of the service provider. Data subjects,
however, are unlikely to find this representation very convenient or meaningful
when attempting to express their privacy preferences.
Our XForms-based approach allows licences to be represented in a more
convenient way by using careful web design, but is limited to making direct
associations between form controls and MPEG REL licence elements. Nor does
it assure a data subject that the licence being produced accurately represents
their privacy preferences unless they have a detailed understanding of MPEG
REL and the time to examine the licence.
Improving the way that licences are presented to users and giving data sub-
jects greater assurance that licences match their preferences is the subject of
further research. Possible approaches include auditing of web sites by consumer
agencies, protocols for negotiating privacy policies [5, 13, 20] and the introduc-
tion of a formal human-readable representation of privacy preferences that can
be mapped to computer-readable licences by machine.
Selecting Documents. Our implementation allows data users to select doc-
uments based on the identifier associated with the document. This may be
acceptable if the identifiers used are meaningful, or if documents can be cho-
sen automatically by a computer system that knows which document ought to
be processed next (for example, by maintaining a queue of jobs to be done).
However, we can imagine situations in which more useful information would be
required in order for a user to decide which document is the one that he or she
is looking for – for example, if a user were looking for documents concerning a
particular topic.
DIDL allows meta-data to be associated with a resource by placing it in a
Descriptor element contained within the component that contains the resource.
This descriptor need not be encrypted even if the resource is governed, and can
be used by a data user to identify resources that he or she might be interested
in. Obviously, however, meta-data may itself constitute private information.
Possible solutions include the use of a trusted search engine [15] and en-
crypted keyword search [1]. These topics are beyond the scope of this paper.
Exceptions. Our system allows data to be used in any situation that can be
foreseen by the data subject at the time the data is created. However, it is easy
to imagine unforeseen exceptional circumstances – such as a medical emergency
– in which it may be desirable to over-ride the restrictions imposed by a licence.
Even if a data subject could foresee all of the exceptional circumstances in
which data might need to be accessible, it seems likely that encoding all of them
into a licence would be cumbersome and inefficient. Furthermore, there may be
cases (notably in law enforcement) where the data subject may not have any
incentive to encode exceptions.
These exceptions can be considered loosely analogous to the fair dealing or
fair use exceptions of copyright law, which allow content users to make some
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copies of copyrighted content without the explicit permission of the copyright
owner. Dealing with these exceptions is very difficult [6], though some authors
have proposed methods using a trusted escrow agent who is able to over-ride a
DRM system if a case for an exception can be made [2]. The development of
analogous systems for privacy is left as future work.
7 Conclusion
SITDRM Enterprise shows how a DRM framework originally developed for copy-
right protection can be applied to privacy protection. It shows how data sub-
jects’ preferences for the use of their data can be encoded in such a way as to
enable a computer system to – so far as is possible using current technology –
ensure that those preferences are adhered to by data users.
Compared to models in which private data is governed by a central policy
set by the organisation’s privacy officer, the digital rights management model
permits data subjects to control the policy to which their data is subject and
ensures that this policy is applied in any organisation to which the data might
travel. The need to compose, manage and interpret large numbers of licences,
however, makes the system somewhat more complex than one in which all data
is subject to a central policy. In particular, the average user may require techno-
logical assistance to be able to produce useful and accurate licences conveniently.
In designing SITDRM Enterprise, it quickly became apparent that the ar-
chitecture we had designed might work just as well for protecting internal docu-
ments generated by company employees as it does for protecting external docu-
ments submitted by data subjects. One might wonder if it is possible to develop
a “grand unified rights management system” that could be deployed in any ap-
plication where there are rights to be protected. Our work with SITDRM may
suggest that this is possible, but it remains to be be seen whether or not a
unified rights management system could be as practical and effective as one
designed for a specific purpose.
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A A Privacy Extension Schema for MPEG REL
The multimedia extension of MPEG REL provides methods of identifying an
item of content that seem sufficient for privacy protection applications, and so
there does not appear to be any need to introduce new kinds of resource in our
privacy extension.
The MPEG REL core schema provides methods of identifying roles and
individuals that seem sufficient for privacy protection applications. However, it
seems useful to allow the destination of a transfer right (such as Embed) to be a
database or other object that is an MPEG REL resource in its own right. Since
the syntax of the Destination condition requires the destination to specified
as a principal, we must introduce a new principal – which we call Resource-
Principal – that makes a resource into a principal. (Of course, we could also
modify the syntax of the Destination condition in the multimedia extension
schema.)
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Right Description
Contact Use the resource to establish a communications channel
Export Export the resource to an ungoverned application or database
Query Submit the resource as a query to a service
Tailor Use the resource for a transient adaptation of a second resource
Table 1: Rights in our privacy extension schema.
Condition Description
ContactMethod Only if the specified means of contact is used
Dealing Only in the context of a particular session or goal
Pseudonym Only if the data is anonymised or pseudonymised
Table 2: Conditions in our our privacy extension schema.
Table 1 lists the new rights that we identified for inclusion in our privacy
extension schema, and Table 2 lists the conditions. For the most part, these are
derived by decomposing the “purposes” and “primary purposes” of P3P into a
combination of an action and the conditions under which that action may take
place. Of course, a number of the actions and conditions so derived are already
present in the standard extension and multimedia extension schemata, and we
have not duplicated such elements in our privacy extension schema.
Note that the Export right is present in XrML, but not in MPEG REL.
This right seemed to us to be necessary for allowing data to be exported to a
specific application or database that performed some function that lay outside
the domain of a terminal of the kind postulated by MPEG-21. The historical
purpose of P3P, for example, contemplates data being exported to some histor-
ical archive. It is unlikely, however, that such an archive would be maintained
by a terminal like IPDoc.
A number of “primary purposes” used in P3P Version 1.1 suggest the use of
a Content condition that restricts the kind of material present on a communica-
tions channel to news, entertainment, marketing, etc. We are not aware of any
computer system that can vet the contents of a channel in this way and so have
chosen not to include such a condition in our privacy extension schema. Restric-
tions of this sort can be achieved to some degree using the Dealing condition,
however, as demonstrated in our example scenario described in Section 5.
B Security Architecture
In order to preserve the integrity of the digital rights management system, gov-
erned content must only be usable under the terms imposed by a licence supplied
by the licence issuer. To this end, we require that
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• content may only be accessed by use of a secure terminal trusted to comply
with the terms of any licence associated with the content; and
• terminals must be able to verify the authenticity and integrity of any
licences purporting to grant privileges over content.
B.1 Key Infrastructure
We assume that every trusted terminal T has a private key K̄T and correspond-
ing public key KT , and that the authenticity of the public key KT can be verified
by licence issuers using some public key infrastructure. The private key K̄T is
known only to the terminal; in particular, it is not known to the human user of
the terminal. In our implementation, we use the well-known RSA algorithm for
all public key cryptographic operations.
We similarly assume that every human user u (both data subjects and data
users) of the system has a private key K̄u and public key Ku. This key pair
is used both for identifying the beneficiary of a licence using the MPEG REL
KeyHolder principal, and for signing licences issued by data subjects. We also
assume that every human user has a secret symmetric master key ku that will be
used for encrypting his or her data according to an algorithm described below.
Finally, each role R is associated with a key pair K̄R and KR that is used
for encrypting keys to be delivered to that role. We assume that the public key
for all of the roles in the system can be obtained from the certificate authority.
B.2 Resource Encryption
Every document x to be submitted to the data controller must be encrypted
with a unique resource key kx. In order to generate a unique resource key, we
require every document x to be associated with a unique digital item identifier
ix. A unique resource key is then generated according to the formula
kx = HMAC-SHA1(ku, ir)
where ku is the master key of the user who created the document. We use the
AES algorithm for all symmetric encryption.
In SITDRM Enterprise, uniqueness of resource identifiers is ensured by as-
suming that every data controller is associated with a unique URI stem. Every
time the data submission form is downloaded from the web server, the data con-
troller uses a counter to generate a new suffix to its URI stem. In our example,
the data controller was assigned the stem urn:au:com:smartinternet and doc-
uments are numbered urn:au:com:smartinternet:customer:1, urn:au:com:
smartinternet:customer:2, etc. in the order in which they are submitted.
B.3 Licences
In SITDRM, every grant of a licence that permits some action to be performed
must contain the key required to perform that action. For security, the key must
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be encrypted in such a way as to render it inaccessible to any party except one
that is entitled to perform the action.
Every resource licence is required to contain the resource key for the resource
to which it refers, encrypted by the public key of the role to which that licence
is awarded. In order to access the resource key, the private key of the role must
be obtained from a membership certificate for that role.
Since data users are not assumed to be trusted, it is not sufficient to encrypt
the private key of a role using the public key of the data user for whom a
membership certificate is intended – this would allow a dishonest data user
to obtain the resource key for a resource. Instead, we require that membership
certificates only be usable on a particular terminal, that is, that a data user may
only act as a member of the role when he or she is using a particular terminal
(presumably one that is owned and operated by the data user’s employer).
The private key of a role is encrypted using the public key of the terminal on
which the membership certificate is to be used, and inserted into the membership
certificate. In this way, the terminal can decrypt the role’s private key from the
membership certificate and use this in turn to decrypt the resource key in a
resource licence. The terminal is trusted not to reveal the role’s private key, the
resource key or the decrypted resource to its human user.
Membership certificates are signed by the role issuer. We assume that a
trusted version of the role issuer’s public key can be obtained from the certificate
authority. Any terminal can then verify the integrity of a membership certificate
by verifying the signature of the role issuer on that certificate.
Unfortunately, the same approach does not suffice for resource licences. Since
all of the humans who use the system have the ability to issue resource licences,
it is possible for a dishonest user to issue a licence for a document created by
any data subject. This can be done by copying the encrypted resource key and
encrypted resource into an arbitrary licence, and signing this licence using the
dishonest user’s private key. The forged licence will be accepted as valid by the
terminal for which the original licence was intended.
There is a fairly simple fix for this problem, though we have not yet imple-
mented it in SITDRM Enterprise. The strategy is to insert a secret into both
the encrypted resource and the signed licence, such that the terminal is able to
recover the secret from both (using its private key) and check that they match.
An attacker is then unable to generate a valid signature for a licence on this
resource since he or she is unable to insert the secret.
Let nx be a random nonce chosen by the data subject every time he or
she encrypts a document x. The nonce is appended to the document prior
to encryption. That is, the encrypted document is x̂ = e(kx, x ‖ nx) where
e(k, m) denotes symmetric encryption of message m with key k and ‖ denotes
concatenation.
Let E be a public key encryption algorithm and S be a signature algorithm,
using parameters analogous to e above. The data subject u can compute a
signed licence L̂ as follows:
1. Compute k̂∗
x
= E(K̄u, nx ‖ kx), that is, the nonce and content key en-
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crypted using the private key of the data subject.
2. Compute k̂x = E(KT , k̂
∗
x
), that is, the nonce and content key further
encrypted using the public key of the terminal.
3. Compute σ = S(K̄u, L ‖ k̂x ‖ Ku), that is, the data subject’s signature
on the original licence L and encrypted nonce and content key.
4. Compute the signed licence L̂ = L ‖ k̂x ‖ Ku ‖ σ.
A terminal can then verify the signature on such a licence as follows:
1. Check that σ is a valid signature for L ‖ k̂x ‖ Ku. If not, stop.
2. Decrypt k̂x using K̄T to obtain k̂
∗
x.
3. Decrypt k̂∗
x
using Ku to obtain nx and kx.
4. Decrypt x̂ to obtain nx and x. If the nx obtained from x̂ is not the same
as that obtained from L̂, stop.
It is straightforward to check that the algorithm is both correct and secure,
assuming that the encryption algorithm E and signature algorithm S are secure.
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